Episode 294 - Ndebele Envoys in England and Selous Translates
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Show notes
The Ndebele chief said the Rudd concession document did not reflect his verbal agreements. His induna’s who’d negotiated the concession disputed the terms as well, along with missionary Charles Helms who’d translated for Lobengula.
Nevertheless, chief negotiator Charles Rudd had returned to Kimberley clutching the concession, a single page document which purported to give Rhodes’ British South Africa company sole rights to mining gold throughout Matabeleland and Mashonaland, and other adjacent territories, in exchange for one thousand Martini Henry Rifles, 100 000 rounds of ammunition, one hundred pounds, and a gunboat on the Zambezi River.
Lobengula said he’d only agreed to the rights for ten men to dig for gold at one spot rather than the general rights throughout the region to the north of the Limpopo river. Once they discovered what Rhodes was claiming, some Ndebele induna’s threatened to revolt.
At least one, Gambo, approached the Boers of the Transvaal. To the East, there was also much trouble brewing in Manicaland. That lay between Delagoa Bay and the highlands of eastern Mashonaland, where the Portuguese lay claim.
In a nutshell, like the headwaters of the Nile and the importance of the Suez Canal, the vast territories north of the Limpopo became the means through which southern Africa and the Cape could be controlled by the British Empire.
The discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand gave the Transvaal the cash to expand northwards and towards the coast and the Boers could rival the existing British dominance in the region north of the Cape. The Portuguese had ancient claims to Mozambique, stretching back almost 500 years and they posed a threat to the sea route between England and India. Then in 1887 Portugal laid claim to the a swath of land stretching coast to coast from Mozambique to Angola through the region north of the Limpopo.
In the British colonial office, Lord Salisbury of the conservative party was trying to stymie the Portuguese, and supported Cecil John Rhodes at least nominally, but only north of the Limpopo. The more grandiose all red-route touted by Rhodes of the Cape to Cairo was a pipedream, thought Salisbury.
He brushed aside the Portuguese protests based on their pre-existing treaties signed by Mashonaland chiefs stretching back to 1629, but then was warned that a Portuguese expedition had set off from the coast led by Colonel Joaquim Carlos Pavia d’Andrada heading towards Mashonaland.
Backed by the newly created Companhia de Mozambique he was joined by Manuel Antonio de Sousa - half Portuguese, half African, mixed race soldier feared by the British because he had mobilised 7000 black irregulars — local warriors.
Before they arrived in upper Manicaland, Lobengula’s two emissaries would arrive in London. Babayane and Mshete were joined by Edward Maund, Rhodes’ adversary in the concession-making business, and Natal translator, John Colenbrander.
As you heard last episode, the emissaries carried two bits of information. One was a letter for Queen Victoria, complaining of Portuguese threats to his east, the other was for the Queen’s ears only, and would be delivered verbally directly to her, face-to-face. Lobengula was going to formally renounce the Rudd concession.
Eventually, on February 6 1889, Maund, Colenbrander, Babayane and Mshete boarded the the steamship Moor, and sailed to London. The next day, a telegram arrived at Robinson’s official residence, apparently the Queen wouldn’t have enough time to meet the envoys because she was preparing for a European trip. Robinson was relieved. Perhaps all the waylaying was going to work out and he wondered, were Babayane and Mshete on a doomed mission?
